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Securing IAB SupplyChain objects
ABSTRACT
An online advertising marketplace comprises buyers and sellers, each with their
intermediaries. A transaction is documented by a SupplyChain object, which includes a set of
entities involved in the transaction. As presently drafted, the Interactive Advertising Bureau
(IAB) standard that specifies the SupplyChain object is susceptible to tampering. For example,
an entry in the SupplyChain object can be changed to falsely imply the involvement of a reputed
player. Conversely, an item in the SupplyChain object can be changed to excise the involvement
of other intermediaries. Per the techniques of this disclosure, a market player or intermediary in a
transaction digitally signs their entry in the SupplyChain object. The SupplyChain object is
thereby authenticated, intermediaries in a transaction are verified as genuine, and parties to a
transaction enjoy higher levels of trust.
KEYWORDS
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● Demand-side platform (DSP)
● Real-time bidding
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BACKGROUND
An online advertising marketplace comprises buyers and sellers, each with their
intermediaries. In the OpenRTB real-time bidding standard [1] of the Interactive Advertising
Bureau (IAB), a transaction is documented by a SupplyChain object, which includes a set of
entities involved in the transaction. The SupplyChain object enables buyers to see everyone
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involved with offering a bid request for sale, from publisher to demand-side platform (DSP). An
entry within the SupplyChain object includes an advertising system identifier (ASI) and the
seller/reseller account identity of the associated entity.
The SupplyChain object enables transparency in the SupplyChain, thereby reducing ad
fraud. However, the SupplyChain object is susceptible to tampering. For example, a malicious
supply-side platform (SSP) can change an entry in the SupplyChain object to falsely imply the
involvement of a reputed player. By doing so, buyers can get the false notion that the reputed
player participated as a seller, thereby falsely making the ad impressions appear trustworthy.
Conversely, a malicious SSP can change an entry in the SupplyChain object to excise the
involvement of intermediaries legitimately involved in the supply of inventory. The malicious
SSP can misrepresent to buyers that it has received a direct request from the publisher, that it is
not a reseller, and that the associated inventory is only available from the malicious SSP.
Per the open real-time bidding (OpenRTB) standard, an entry of the SupplyChain object
comprises two or more fields, some of which are described in the table below.
Name

Description
Advertising System Identifier. The canonical domain name of the SSP, exchange,
header, wrapper, etc. that bidders connect to. This may be an operational domain, if

asi

different from the parent corporate domain, such that WHOIS and reverse IP
lookups can establish clear ownership. This can be set to the value used to identify
sellers in an ads.txt file, if one exists.
The identifier associated with the seller or reseller account within the advertising
marketplace. This comprises the value used in transactions, e.g., OpenRTB bid

pid

requests, in the field specified by the SSP/exchange. Typically, in OpenRTB, this is
the publisher ID. For OpenDirect it is typically the organization ID of the publisher.

Table 1: Certain fields of the SupplyChain object, per OpenRTB and other standards
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DESCRIPTION
Per techniques of this disclosure, one or more fields are appended to each entry of the
SupplyChain object to cryptographically protect the object from tampering or falsification. These
additional fields are indicated in Table 2.
Name

Description
The current node, which represents an intermediary in the supply chain,

next_asi

sets this field to the next intermediary (node) within the supply chain, e.g.,
the node to which the current node sends the ad request.

digital_signature

The digital signature of the current node.
The current node, which represents an intermediary in the supply chain,

previous_asi

sets this field to the previous intermediary (node) within the supply chain,
e.g., the node from which the current node received the ad request.

Table 2: Additional fields of the SupplyChain object, serving to secure the SupplyChain object

The digital_signature field enables each entity involved in a transaction to sign its entry
in the SupplyChain object, thereby improving the integrity of the SupplyChain object. The
next_asi and previous_asi fields in an entry of the SupplyChain object point respectively to the
next and the previous entities of the transaction. Adding the next_asi and the previous_asi fields
transforms the set of entities in the SupplyChain object into a singly or doubly linked list, further
improving the integrity of the SupplyChain object. The digital_signature is the signature of a
node of the linked list, generated by the intermediary represented by the node, and appended to
the end of the linked list.
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Fig. 1: Formation of SupplyChain object by different intermediaries

Fig. 1 illustrates the coordinated formation of a SupplyChain object by different
intermediaries in the SupplyChain. A SupplyChain object (102) is received by an intermediary
N. Per the techniques, the SupplyChain object includes a linked list, a node of which includes the
asi-field of the intermediary (104a), the digital signature of the intermediary (104b), a pointer to
the next intermediary (104c), a pointer to the previous intermediary (104d), and other fields
(104e). The receiving intermediary, identified by its asi-field (N), creates a node of the
SupplyChain object (106) with similar fields, populates the fields appropriately, and appends it
to the received SupplyChain object. A proper chain of trust is thus formed by an intermediary
creating an entry of the SupplyChain object and appending it to the end of the linked-list of the
SupplyChain object.
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An intermediary digitally signs its appended SupplyChain object as follows. All fields of
the to-be-appended SupplyChain object are populated. In particular, the digital signature field is
set to the value of the digital signature field of the previous node in the supply chain. If such a
node doesn’t exist, then the digital signature field is set to null. The digital signature of the to-beappended SupplyChain object is calculated using the private key of the intermediary. The digital
signature field of the to-be-appended SupplyChain object is updated with the just-calculated
digital signature.
Verifying the chain of trust: overall integrity of the SupplyChain object
A recipient of a SupplyChain object can verify the overall integrity of the SupplyChain
object as follows. Starting with the first node in the SupplyChain object, the recipient walks
down the chain, comparing the next_asi field of a node with the asi-field of the next node. If the
two fields don’t match, the supply chain has a gap; it is incomplete. Similarly, starting with the
last node in the SupplyChain object, the recipient walks up the chain, comparing the
previous_asi field of a node with the asi-field of the previous node. If the two fields don’t match,
the supply chain has a gap.
Verifying the chain of trust: integrity of each node
To verify the integrity of a node in the supply chain, e.g., whether a node has been
modified during transmission, the recipient downloads the public key of the canonical domain
included in the asi-field of the node. Such a public key can be obtained from a well-known URL
in the domain, e.g., of the form intermediary_N.com/.well_known/public_key.txt. The recipient
verifies the digital signature using the example pseudo-code illustrated in Fig. 2.
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for each node in the SupplyChain object:
set copy_of_node = node
if previous_node exists:
set copy_of_node.digital_signature = previous_node.digital_signature
else
clear field copy_of_node.digital_signature
verify digital signature of copy_of_node using the public key
downloaded from node.asi and node.digital_signature
Fig. 2: Pseudo-code to verify a node of the supply chain

Attesting the beginning of the chain
A malicious SSP may supplant a received supply chain with a new, false SupplyChain
object and claim itself to be the beginning of the supply chain. To guard against this possibility, a
publicly verifiable attestation specifies the beginning of the chain as follows. When an ad request
is generated, e.g., by an app or browser, the operating system of the device generates an ad
request attestation token, one of the parameters of the token being the canonical domain name of
the entity to which the request is being sent. The asi-field of the first node of the SupplyChain
object is set to that canonical domain name. To verify the beginning of the chain, intermediaries
compare the asi-field of the first node of the received SupplyChain object with that of the ad
request attestation token.
Reducing the size of the SupplyChain object during transmission
For well-formed SupplyChain objects, the value of the asi-field of one node is the same
as the value of the next_asi field of the previous node, and the previous_asi field of the next
node. The size of SupplyChain object can be reduced for the purposes of bandwidth optimization
without sacrificing tamper-resistance, as follows. The next_asi value of the previous node can be
omitted during transmission if it is equal to the value of the asi-field of the current node.
Similarly, the previous_asi field of the current node can be omitted if it is the same as the asi-
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field of the previous node. During verification, if the next_asi field of a node that is not the last
node in a supply chain is missing, the next_asi value of the node is assumed to be the same as the
value of the asi-field of the next node in the supply chain. Similarly, if the previous_asi field of a
node that is not the first node in a supply chain is missing, the previous_asi value of the node is
assumed to be the same as the asi-field of the previous node in the supply chain.
Client-side header bidding or mediation
Most communications between adjacent entities in the advertising marketplace are of
server-to-server type, e.g., RTB calls over OpenRTB or other standards. However, some
communication can be between server and client, e.g., browser. If an intermediary transmits a
snippet comprising a SupplyChain object to a client browser, it may not receive feedback on how
the snippet behaves when rendered in the browser. An intermediary in communication with a
client can append a new node to the SupplyChain object and set the next_asi field of the
appended node to client. In such a remnant line item, or similar, scenario, the snippet calls one
server, e.g., the (N+1)st intermediary, with the SupplyChain object received by the Nth
intermediary as parameter. The (N+1)st intermediary appends a new node using previously
described techniques. An example of the fully constructed SupplyChain object is illustrated in
Fig. 3.
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Fig. 3: Example SupplyChain object under client-server communications

CONCLUSION
Per techniques of this disclosure, a market player in an online advertising marketplace
governed, e.g., by IAB’s open real-time bidding standard, digitally signs its entry in the
SupplyChain object that documents a transaction. The SupplyChain object is thereby
authenticated, intermediaries in a transaction are verified as genuine, and parties to a transaction
enjoy higher levels of trust.
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